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ARGUMENT
I.
MS. BLACK PAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT AN AWARD
OF NONTERMINABLE ALIMONY I S
EQUITABLE IN THIS ACTION

Petitioner/Appellee/Cross-Appellant

Cherise Roundy

(Barney)

Black ("Ms. Black") s t a t e s t h a t "Appellant has f a i l e d t o e s t a b l i s h
the impropriety of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s awarding Cherise permanent
alimony."

Brief

of Appellee and Cross-Appellant

("Appellee's

Brief") a t 10. Respondent/Appellant/Cross-Appellee V. Craig Barney
("Mr. Barney") does not appeal the award of permanent alimony 1 t o
Ms. Black.

Mr. Barney does, however, appeal the t r i a l

court's

award of alimony t h a t does not terminate upon the remarriage of Ms.
Black ("nonterminable alimony").
these

two concepts

Martinez

v.

is

Martinez.

Ms. Black's confusion between

readily
754

apparent

P.2d

69

in her

(Utah

Ct.

argument
App.

1988)

that
is

" i l l u s t r a t i v e and probative" on the issue of nonterminable alimony.
Appellee's Brief a t 10.
In Martinez, the t r i a l court entered an award of alimony for
a period of

five y e a r s , which was nonterminable by reason of

remarriage for a period of t h r e e y e a r s .
vacated

the

trial

court's

alimony

Id. a t 74.

award

and

This Court

instead

awarded

Permanent alimony i s an award of alimony "on a c o n t i n u i n g b a s i s " or
"for an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d of t i m e . " Permanent alimony may t e r m i n a t e , however,
upon t h e occurrence of c e r t a i n s t a t u t o r y e v e n t s such as a s u b s t a n t i a l m a t e r i a l
change i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d e a t h , r e m a r r i a g e or c o h a b i t a t i o n . Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5(7-9).

1

"permanent alimony in the sum of $750.00 per month subject to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987)."

Id. at 75.

By

making the award subject to the provisions of § 30-3-5, the award
would terminate upon the recipient spouse's remarriage.2

The

version of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, relied on by this Court in
Martinez, provided:
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon
the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the
remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying
alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and
his rights are determined. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)
(1987)
Therefore, in Martinez. this Court took the trial court's alimony
award, which contained a nonterminable component, and converted it
to a longer term alimony award which did terminate upon the
recipient spouse's remarriage.

In this case, Mr. Barney is not

appealing the permanent alimony award, but he is appealing the
trial court's error in ordering that the award does not terminate
if and when Ms. Black remarries.

In relying on this Court's

decision in Martinez. Ms. Black has simply confused

the two

distinct concepts of permanent alimony and nonterminable alimony.
The plain irony of Ms. Black's reliance on this Court's opinion in
Martinez is that this Court actually vacated the nonterminable

In fact, the alimony award of the district court on remand in
Martinez specifically provides that alimony terminates upon the remarriage of
the recipient spouse.

2

component of the alimony award in favor of an award that terminated
upon remarriage.
The other defect of Ms. Black's argument regarding alimony is
in the discussion of the parties1 standard of living during the
marriage.

Ms. Black argues that she "will need nonterminable

alimony to allow her to maintain a standard of living more in line
with what she became accustomed to in the marriage."
Brief at 14.

Appellee's

However, the trial court found that the parties1

standard of living was established through their irresponsible
spending habits and could not possibly be maintained. R. 132-9, R.
149, and R. 995, pp.41-42. Ms. Black now argues that her alimony
should continue, despite remarriage, so that she can maintain what
the trial court found to be a standard of living not supportable by
the parties1 income.

Ms. Black's rationale flies in the face of

common sense.
Finally, the award of nonterminable alimony is contrary to the
public policy behind the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3,
which provides that "every man shall support his wife when she is
in need." Id. Ms. Black's new husband is now obligated to support
her. Mr. Barney should not now have that same obligation. As the
Utah Supreme Court noted in Openshaw v. Openshaw, 12 P. 2d 3 64 (Utah
1932),
it is an ancient doctrine of the common law that it is
the duty of a husband to support his wife. Such is still
the law of this state . . . . This duty of support does
not end when the marriage is dissolved by a decree of
divorce rendered at the suit of the wife for the
3

husband's matrimonial wrongs; but it continues so long as
they both shall live, the wife remains unmarried and
needs such support, and the husband is able to provide
the same. Id. at 3 68.
An award of alimony that does not terminate upon the remarriage of
the

recipient

principle.

spouse

is contrary

to

this

fundamental

legal

Ms. Black's desire to maintain a standard of living

that the trial court found to be well beyond the parties' means
cannot justify an award of alimony that continues beyond Ms.
Black's remarriage.

An award of nonterminable alimony in this

action is not justified and is not equitable.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE SUFFICIENT
FINDINGS BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED
AT TRIAL REGARDING THE CHILDREN'S NEED FOR
CHILD SUPPORT ABOVE THE STATUTORY GUIDELINE AMOUNT
Ms. Black next asserts that the evidence is "legion and
undisputed that the parties had an extravagant lifestyle, lived
beyond their means, and that the children participated in that
lifestyle right along with the parents." Appellee's Brief at 18.
Ms.

Black

argues that the parties' extravagant

lifestyle is

sufficient to justify an award of child support which exceeds the
highest level of the statutory guidelines.

Ms. Black cites this

Court's decision in Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App.
1993), as providing the "accepted definition of need." Appellee's
Brief at 18.

Notably, both Ostler and Peterson v. Peterson, 748

P.2d 593 (Utah App. 1988) (the citation omitted from Appellee's
Brief at 18) , were decided prior to the implementation of the
4

statutory child support guidelines.
cases attempted to define "need."

Moreover, neither of these

In Ostler, this Court vacated

and remanded the child support award based on the failure of the
trial court to make specific factual findings regarding child
support and the trial court's failure to apply those factors in
making a modified child support award.

In Peterson, this Court

reversed and remanded the trial court's award of child support
which was based upon the unemployment income of the payor spouse.
If a trial court awards child support at a higher level then
that provided by the statutory child support guidelines then the
trial court

is required

to make

specific

child(ren)'s needs support the award.

findings that the

A general reference to the

parties extravagant lifestyle and a statement that the children
shared in that lifestyle, which was found to be unsustainable, is
insufficient to support a deviation from the statutory guidelines.
"Rather a trial judge must consider and make specific findings on
all 'appropriate and just' facts."
1006, 1014 (Utah Ct. App 1996).

Ball v. Peterson. 912 P. 2d

The trial court did not make such

findings because no evidence was introduced, nor does any exist,
which would support a need for child support greater than the
statutory child support guidelines.

In that no quantitative

evidence was introduced at trial, it is impossible to marshal any
evidence to support the trial court's vague, qualitative findings
of fact.

5

III.
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE
DENTAL PRACTICE A MARITAL ASSET
Confusingly, Ms. Black argues that "Mr. Barney's business
should be considered an asset of the martial estate."
Brief at 20.

Appellee's

In fact, the trial court did concluded that the

dental practice was a marital asset.

In paragraphs 4, 6, and 7 of

its findings, the trial court states:
4. The court finds that the tangible assets of the
Respondent's dental practice are marital property.
6.

The dental equipment has a current value of

forty thousand dollars ($40,000).

This is the value

assigned to the equipment by Respondent.
7.

The present value of the dental equipment

assets of the dental practice should be evenly divided
between the parties; twenty thousand ($20,000) to each
party.
R. 840
The trial court specifically found that the accounts payable
were equal in value to the accounts receivable and therefore the
equipment constituted the only business-related asset with any
value to be considered.

R. 840. The trial court also recognized,

correctly, that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in

Sorenson v.

Sorenson, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), does not permit the valuation
of a sole practitioner's practice unless the professional has
6

retired and sold the practice.

See id.

The dental practice was

considered a marital asset under the applicable Utah law.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Barney respectfully requests this
Court to order that (i) Ms. Black's alimony award terminate on
remarriage; (ii) child support be awarded at the highest statutory
table amount; and (iii) the judgments in the amounts of $8,000.00
and $20,000.00, entered as a part of the property division of the
trial court, be vacated.
DATED: July 10, 2000
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

DEAN C. ANDREASEN
MATTHEW A. STEWARD
Attorneys for
Respondent/Appellant/Cross Appellee
V. Craig Barney
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